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TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE NORMATIVE
ELEMENTS OF THE PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL:
AN APPLICATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Jonathan R. Macey*
N the wake of the Coase Theorem,1 transaction costs have come
to play the pivotal role in economic discourse as it relates to le-
gal issues. The Coase Theorem posits that, absent transaction
costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of the choice of
legal rule.2 In a wide variety of contexts, therefore, the quest to
formulate efficient rules focuses on the nature of the transaction
costs that hamper the parties' ability to contract effectively among
themselves. This essay presents a model of the role that transac-
tion costs play in the economic theory of legislation.$ By emphasiz-
ing the role of transaction costs in the "public choice" model, this
exercise seeks to develop a normative argument about how consti-
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B., Harvard University, 1977; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1982. I am grateful for comments received at faculty workshops at Cornell Law
School and the Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University, and during
conversations with James M. Buchanan, William N. Eskridge, Jr., David B. Lyons, William
T. Mayton, Dale A. Oesterle, Russell K. Osgood, and Steven H. Shiffrin. Robert McDon-
ough, Cornell Law School '89, provided valuable research assistance.
I Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
2 This succinct formulation of the Coase Theorem is taken from A. Polinsky, An Intro-
duction to Law and Economics 12 (1983). For a useful and accessible discussion of the Coase
Theorem, see id. at 11-13.
1 The economic approach to legislation applies standard principles of microeconomics to
the provision of legislative protections. The development of a positive economic theory of
legislation can be traced to J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962), and
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971). For
extensions of the theory, see Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211 (1976).
The economic theory of legislation is sometimes referred to as "public choice" theory.
Public choice theory originated in the literature of game theory and provides the theoretical
foundation for some of the insights of the economic theory of legislation. Professor Robert
Tollison's review essay in this Symposium provides a useful description of both the current
state of the literature on the economic theory of legislation and the more theoretical litera-
ture in the field of public choice. See Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 Va. L. Rev.
339 (1988).
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tutional rules in a "rent-seeking"" society can increase societal
wealth and improve the quality of a representative democracy.
An important goal of a well-developed legal system is to promul-
gate rules that reduce the transaction costs facing privately con-
tracting parties.5 Mutual agreements reached by privately con-
tracting parties work to the benefit of both parties. Therefore, to
the extent that the legal system can facilitate these transactions by
reducing their costs, everyone is made better off. By way of con-
trast, another important goal of a legal system that desires to pro-
mote social stability and social welfare is to increase the transac-
tion costs facing parties who seek enactment of legislation that
would employ the machinery of the state to effect coercive wealth
transfers from one group to another. Even the possibility of such
transfers reduces the wealth of society as a whole, as people are
driven to consume resources to block such transfers.6
Part I of this Article presents both a brief description of the eco-
nomic theory of legislation and an examination of its normative
implications. The most important normative implication is that
the use of governmental regulation to achieve wealth transfers im-
poses significant costs on society by impeding the process through
which market forces create wealth. Unfortunately, however, it is
extremely difficult to distinguish between those governmental ac-
tivities that involve "amorally redistributive' '7 rent-seeking (and
therefore should be prohibited) and those that represent wealth-
increasing "public interest"8 governmental activities (and therefore
' Rent-seeking refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., rates of return on the
use of an economic asset in excess of the market rate) through governmental intervention in
the market. An example of rent-seeking is a firm's attempt to secure government-granted
monopolies. Such monopolies allow a firm to increase its prices above competitive levels.
The resulting profits represent economic rents from government regulation.
I Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Be-
tween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 266 (1985).
' This Article embraces the assumption that wealth creation and wealth transfers are mu-
tually exclusive. I do not, however, mean to suggest that wealth transfers cannot enhance
overall societal utility.
I The phrase "amorally redistributive" is Judge Posner's. See Posner, Economics, Politics,
and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1982).
8 In addition to serving as a forum for rent-seeking activity, the government also performs
important public interest functions, such as providing public goods (e.g., national defense);
overcoming free-rider problems that prevent private parties from reaching mutually advan-
tageous agreements (which is, for example, the ostensible purpose of environmental laws);
and providing a responsible yet coercive enforcement mechanism for privately negotiated
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should be encouraged). For example, though laws that transfer
wealth from one group to another are perhaps the classic example
of rent-seeking legislation,9 such statutes also may be passed to
solve the free-rider problems that thwart private efforts to reach
the level of transfers that the transferors would prefer.'0 Thus, the
benefit of distinguishing interest group legislation from public in-
terest legislation often will not be worth the cost.
Part II examines the current status of public choice scholarship
in light of the normative principles developed in Part I. Scholarly
opinion differs widely on the positive and normative implications
of public choice theory, and this Part explores those implications.
In the application of normative principles, transaction costs play
the pivotal role in the economic theory of legislation. The role that
transaction costs play in constitutional theory is of particular
interest.
Two possible constitutional strategies can control the temptation
of elected officials to sacrifice principle for partisanship in the
course of daily political life. The first is to design a constitutional
system that establishes incentives for politicians to behave in the
public interest. Unfortunately, due to the lack of an effective mea-
sure of individual marginal performance upon which to base an in-
centive system for politicians, incentive-based constitutional sys-
tems do not hold much promise as a means to control the behavior
of elected officials.
contracts. For essays on the "public interest" role of government, see W. Baumol, Welfare,
Economics and the Theory of the State (2d ed. 1965); A. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare
(4th ed. 1932). In economic terms, the public interest functions of government are to inter-
vene in the market economy to correct market failures or distributional shortcomings. See
R. McCormick & R. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An Inquiry into the
Interest-Group Theory of Government 3-5 (1981).
9 See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Eco-
nomic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 17 (1984) (other indicia of rent-seeking legislation include
limitations on entry into businesses, subsidies of one group by another, and prohibitions on
private contracting in response to new statutory entitlements); see also R. McCormick & R.
Tollison, supra note 8, at 49 ("Occupational licensing is a specific and important manifesta-
tion of the theory of economic regulation. . . . [T]he benefits of licensing accrue to mem-
bers of the licensed profession in the form of increased rents due to entry limitations and
restrictions on price competition within the profession. Moreover, such legislation typically
results from lobbying pressure by practitioners in the occupation. .. ").
"0 Posner, supra note 7, at 265 (arguing that wealth redistribution is a public good no
different in kind from protection against crime or pollution; therefore, free-rider problems
may thwart private efforts to effect such transfers).
1988]
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The second possibility is to design a constitutional system that
raises the transaction costs to interest groups of obtaining passage
of redistributive legislation. The most obvious way to do this is
simply to forbid government officials from doing certain things.
Politicians and bureaucrats, however, can easily ignore or misinter-
pret constitutional provisions when doing so is in their interest.
Language is extremely malleable, so even those constraints on gov-
ernmental action that appear to be the most secure are subject to
reinterpretation. In addition to providing verbal commandments to
officials and their constituents, constitutions can organize the
structure of government so as to raise the costs of rent-seeking.
This Article posits that this sort of constitutional protection is the
most effective means of controlling post-constitutional interest
group opportunism; it provides the greatest hope for lasting consti-
tutional protection against the problem of faction.
Part II of this Article also presents some tentative conclusions,
drawn from the economic theory of legislation, about the role of
constitutions in social ordering. Finally, Part III arrays the model
developed in Part II against the backdrop of the United States
Constitution and suggests ways that a transaction-costs analysis
may be applied to evaluate constitutions.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF LEGISLATION: STUDIED POSITIVISM
The modern economic theory of legislation can be summarized
easily. To use Judge Richard Posner's description, the economic
(or "interest group") theory of legislation "asserts that legislation
is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that
legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest
value from it, regardless of overall social welfare."'1 The scholar-
ship that has advanced the economic theory of legislation either
comes directly from or has been heavily influenced by one of three
sources. The first is the so-called "Virginia School," whose leading
exponents are James Buchanan (the 1986 Nobel Laureate in Eco-
nomics), Gordon Tullock, and Robert Tollison. The second impor-
tant line of scholarship has been generated by a host of economists
and lawyers at the University of Chicago, led by Nobel Laureate
George Stigler and including Sam Peltzman, Judge Posner, Wil-
21 Id.
474 [Vol. 74:471
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liam Landes, and Gary Becker. Finally, economists and political
scientists affiliated with the University of Maryland, particularly
Mancur Olson, have made seminal contributions to the literature
on interest groups and political life.
A. The Current State of the Literature
The many works of these economists and lawyers, though ex-
ceedingly wide-ranging in scope, share two common elements.
First, they have advanced the economic theory of legislation by fo-
cusing on the differing organizational costs that face rival political
coalitions. Basically, efficiency considerations indicate that a group
forms into an effective political coalition when the benefits from
achieving wealth transfers from the legislature outweigh the costs
of organizing. For a number of reasons, some groups will be able to
organize more cheaply than others;12 thus, literature focusing on
the factors that influence the costs of forming an effective political
coalition explores an extremely important avenue of research. If
those groups that are likely to organize into effective political co-
alitions can be identified ex ante, then the nature of their prefer-
ences can be specified, and likely legislative outcomes can be
predicted.
The second, and perhaps more important, common element is
the remarkable absence of normative tone in the serious, scholarly
literature on the economic theory of legislation. As Professor Tol-
lison remarks in his contribution to this Symposium, the issue is
not "whether a law is 'good' or 'bad,' but why the law was passed,
how the law was passed, why it has not been repealed, and so
on."13 In providing his excellent survey of the current public choice
literature, Tollison goes on to point out that "the use of 'interest
group' as a modifier [in the literature on the economic theory of
legislation] is not meant to be pejorative. 1 4 Indeed, Judge Posner
has identified the positive-normative dichotomy as the principal
difference between the modern economic theory of legislation and
the traditional view of legislation. Posner claims that the economic
12 See R. McCormick & R. Tollison, supra note 8, at 16-18; M. Olson, The Rise and De-
cline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 18 (1982).
13 Tollison, supra note 3, at 339.
14 Id. at 341.
1988]
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approach is (and should be) purely positive, whereas the tradi-
tional approach was predominantly normative.1 5
At one level, there is good reason for the decidedly descriptive
tone of the current literature. The interest group theory of legisla-
tion predicts that laws are passed because some interest group has
provided political support to the relevant political operatives in
levels sufficient to obtain the desired legislation. This conclusion,
however, tells us nothing about whether the law is "good" or "bad"
from a normative standpoint. Although the interest group may
have obtained passage of the statute simply to effect a wealth
transfer from some less powerful group to itself, the interest
group's efforts may nevertheless advance overall social welfare by
promoting the production of a public good, or by overcoming some
free-rider difficulty that impedes the market's ability to solve a
particular problem. 16 Thus, the economic theory of legislation fo-
cuses narrowly on the mechanics of the legislative process, not on
whether the outcomes generated by this process offer a net benefit
to society. Nonetheless, public choice theory does contain profound
normative implications.
B. Descriptive Gaps and Normative Implications
One normative implication of the economic theory of legislation
emerges even from the foregoing thumbnail description of the the-
ory. The earlier, naive view of legislators as public-regarding
guardian angels who meet periodically to right the wrongs of soci-
ety has been thoroughly discredited. 17 It has been replaced by a
more accurate vision of the legislature as a marketplace, which
generates a variety of outcomes, only some of which provide a net
15 See Posner, supra note 7, at 263 & n.1 (describing the economic theory of regulation as
a positive theory "breaking with the older, predominantly normative tradition"). But cf. id.
at 266 ("From a normative standpoint, therefore, the interest group theory is pessimistic
concerning the purpose and effects of legislation . . ").
"' See Becker, supra note 3, at 384-85 ("[P]olitical policies that raise efficiency are more
likely to be adopted than policies that lower efficiency"). Policies that increase efficiency are
likely to be adopted because such policies are less likely to be opposed successfully by rival
interest groups. Activities that benefit all groups will rationally be opposed by no groups.
Such policies will be adopted if they receive even lukewarm support from one or more inter-
"est groups. See id. at 383. The difficulties arise when certain groups press for policies that
increase efficiency but also entail the taxation or regulation of other groups.
1 See Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 Am.
Econ. Rev. 279, 279 (1984).
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benefit to society. The outcomes generated by this marketplace re-
flect a political equilibrium that in turn reflects the relative
strengths of rival groups.18
From this more sophisticated vision of government emerges a
whole new-and admittedly normative-view of the role of law in
society. If, in fact, a democratically elected legislature cannot be
trusted to act consistently in the public interest, then even those
who advocate an expanded role for government must see the need
for some constraint on the lawmaking process. From a public
choice perspective, however, the role of the legal system is not sim-
ply to restrain interest groups, but rather to serve as a filter, sifting
out and discarding legislation that is simply redistributive and
serves no useful societal purpose, while permitting legislation that
does more than provide wealth transfers from the politically pow-
erful to the politically weak.
It must be emphasized that even in its current, purely descrip-
tive incarnation, the economic theory of legislation provides a far
richer picture of the lawmaking process than does its public inter-
est rival. Nonetheless, the glaring gap in the normative content of
the current literature should be filled.19
1. Private vs. Public Ordering
Both the economic theory of legislation and traditional
microeconomic analysis identify two possible methods by which in-
dividuals and firms can increase their stock of wealth. First,
microeconomic theory describes the market transaction mechanism
through which firms and individuals create wealth. Such transac-
tions benefit not only the individual parties to the transaction but
also society at large, as entrepreneurs are "coaxed by competitive
forces to provide what others want on improved terms, a serendipi-
" The interest group political equilibrium analysis began with a pioneering book by Ar-
thur Bentley. See A. Bentley, The Process of Government 258-59 (1967) ("Pressure ...
indicates the push and resistance between groups. The balance of the group's pressure is the
existing state of society."). Pathbreaking contributions to the theory have come from
Becker, supra note 3; Peltzman, supra note 3; Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 335 (1974); Stigler, supra note 3.
" This gap has been noticed by others. See Buchanan, Comment, 18 J.L. & Econ. 903,
904-05 (1975) (urging careful separation of the positive from the normative); Tollison, Com-
ment, in Constitutional Economics: Containing the Economic Powers of Government 59 (R.
McKenzie ed. 1984) [hereinafter Constitutional Economics].
1988]
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tous benefit to the public that was in no way a part of the entre-
preneur's intentions. ' 20 For this reason, an emerging group of
"constitutional economists" have considered forcing transactions
out of the political sphere and into the private sector to increase
societal wealth and overall utility-an important purpose of a
properly functioning constitution.2
Alternatively, firms and individuals seeking profits can turn to
the legislative arena, where wealth is transferred rather than cre-
ated. In the real world, of course, we observe firms pursuing both
strategies simultaneously. The automobile industry, for example,
expends resources making cars, but it also expends resources lob-
bying to obtain rent-seeking legislation. At the margin, firms will
choose to divert their resources from one activity to another, de-
pending on which investment appears to offer the highest return.
Unlike wealth creation, which increases societal wealth, rent-
seeking imposes several significant costs on society. The most
widely understood external costs are those that third parties en-
counter when they attempt to block legislation that threatens to
transfer wealth from those third parties to the rent-seeking inter-
est groups. In addition, rent-seeking is inefficient because it can
result in several forms of deadweight social losses. For example,
deadweight social losses will occur to the extent that interest
groups seeking wealth transfers must expend resources to obtain
those transfers.22 As Judge Posner and others have pointed out, an
interest group will find it efficient to expend up to $99.99 to obtain
a $100.00 wealth transfer.23 This $99.99 is a deadweight social loss;
the figure represents a sum that could have been spent to create
wealth. Deadweight social losses also occur when legislation creates
truly unnecessary regulation that imposes greater costs on some
firms than others, thus giving certain firms a competitive edge.
Where such regulations exist, deadweight loss results as the parties
20 The point, of course, is Adam Smith's; the expression is Richard McKenzie's. See Mc-
Kenzie, Introduction, in Constitutional Economics, supra note 19, at 4.
21 Id.
22 See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. Econ. J. 224,
228-30 (1967).
23 See Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807, 812
(1975); Rogerson, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analy-
sis, 13 Bell J. Econ. 391, 391 (1982).
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subject to the regulation must expend resources to comply with the
regulation.
2 4
Another, more subtle cost of interest group regulation, recently
described in an important article by James Alm, is that it prompts
economic resources to be diverted from more valued to less val-
ued-but unregulated-uses.2 5 Finally, the power of the govern-
ment to effect wealth transfers imposes costs even on markets that
appear to be operating free of governmental intrusion; even in
such unregulated markets, economic actors must expend resources
to keep their markets clear of governmental regulation. This phe-
nomenon has recently been labeled (quite graphically) as "rent ex-
traction. ' 26 It is distinguishable from the more widely recognized
legislative practice of "rent creation," by which government creates
a cartel for a particular industry subgroup by enacting regulations
that favor that group at the expense of consumers or rival
producers. s7
In sum, economic actors expend vast amounts of resources to ob-
tain rent-seeking legislation, to comply with it, to avoid having to
comply with it, to adjust to it, and to prevent it from being enacted
in the first place. All of this activity is dealt with thoroughly-at a
descriptive level-in the existing public choice literature. Perhaps
it is best summarized by Mancur Olson's description of three im-
plications of the interest group model of political behavior.28 First,
"special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and
aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make
political life more divisive. 2 9 Second, interest group coalitions or-
ganized to effect wealth transfers "slow down a society's capacity
to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response
to changing conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic
growth."30 Finally, distributional coalitions increase "the complex-
21 See Tullock, supra note 22, at 225. In addition, products produced in cartelized envi-
ronments cause deadweight social losses because consumers must pay more for them. Id.
25 Aim, The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy, 23 Econ. Inquiry 243, 243 & n.1
(1985).
24 McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion, 16 J. Legal Stud. 101, 102-03 (1987).
217 See id. at 103; see also Stigler, supra note 3, at 5-6 (providing the basis for the idea of
"rent creation").
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ity of regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of
understandings,"3' 1 thereby retarding the social evolution of a soci-
ety and raising the costs of all forms of economic activity.
2. Unanswered Questions
From the existing economic model of legislation, one burning
question emerges: Why is there any economic growth at all, given
the power of the modern Leviathan which, acting as the arm of
powerful interest group coalitions, steals the proceeds of such
wealth creation through taxation and regulation? The economic
theory of legislation seems to have no ability to predict whether
wealth transfer activities will cease before they strip society of all
of its capacity to produce wealth. Indeed Professor Olson has ar-
gued that special interest groups' tendency, in stable industrial so-
cieties, to organize into effective political coalitions to bring about
wealth transfers to themselves from less powerful groups implies
that democratic economic systems will ultimately crumble, as gov-
ernments slowly but systematically remove private parties' incen-
tives to create wealth.
32
The most casual empirical analysis indicates, however, that
something is profoundly wrong with that theoretical model. We ob-
serve stable societies that enjoy remarkable growth. The postwar
economic successes of Japan and Germany, and the long-term sta-
bility of Switzerland, are obvious examples, but even Hong Kong,
South Korea, Singapore, and the recent reemergence of Great Brit-
ain's economy present serious analytical problems for the current
interest group paradigm.
C. Constitutions and Incentives
The current scholarship fails to recognize (indeed, it seriously
disputes) that a fully informed (and non-suicidal) populace has
strong incentives to design a system of government that regulates
the future wealth transfer activities of interest groups. In light of
the fact that interest group legislation benefits politically powerful
subgroups within society, at first blush the proposition that a con-
sensus blocking such transfer activity could win widespread sup-
31 Id.
32 Id. at 77.
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port seems counterintuitive. The argument, however, becomes far
more plausible when one recognizes that each interest group is
comprised of private citizens who lose more often than they gain
from wealth transfer activity. A simple example demonstrates the
point. If an interest group spends $50.00 to obtain $100.00 in
wealth transfers, gains from trade can be realized if the transferors
(i.e., the taxpayers) agree to pay the beneficiaries $51.00 to refrain
from seeking the transfer. The rent-seekers have gained $1.00, and
the transferors have gained $49.00 in the form of regulatory
forbearance.
By agreeing ex ante (i.e., at the time of constitutional creation)
to constrain rent-seeking, everyone can be made better off, because
even those few who expect to be net winners from the wealth
transfer game can be induced through side payments to support a
constitutional structure that restricts coercive, inefficient wealth
transfers. Thus, the interest group dynamic during times of consti-
tutional creation may be completely different than during times of
ordinary politics-when wealth transfers dominate the political
landscape. The fundamental difference between the incentives that
face lawmakers (and private citizens) during times of constitu-
tional creation and the incentives that face lawmakers during
times of ordinary politics explains why constitutions are likely to
be more public-regarding than statutes.33
The economic historian Douglass North provides the basis for an
important additional reason why constitutions are likely to contain
rules that embody a broader conception of the public interest than
the rules generated in the normal course of legislative life.34 In his
theory of the state, North posits that the state is constrained "by
11 I have described the incentives that exist during periods of constitutional creation
elsewhere:
Individual members of a particular special interest group are hurt as much as any
member of the public by any special interest legislation not specifically designed to
benefit their group. . . .Thus, even special interest groups that might benefit from
some specific, discrete legislative wealth transfers are likely to object to general con-
stitutional provisions that facilitate rent-seeking.
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An In-
terest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 246-47 (1986) [hereinafter Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation]; see also Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitu-
tion, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 501, 525-26 (1987) (explaining the incentives facing interest
groups in times of ordinary politics in terms of the prisoner's dilemma).
3' North, A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History, 16 Explorations
Econ. Hist. 249 (1979).
1988] 481
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the opportunity cost of its constituents."35 Because potential sub-
stitutes for the existing regime always exist, the state will find it
relatively difficult to extract wealth from its constituents if there
are other states to which its constituents may move at low cost, or
if some individuals within the state may attempt to displace the
existing government.3
The reasons for the phenomenon articulated by North are
straightforward. First, individuals involved in wealth-producing ac-
tivities may find it advantageous to move to another jurisdiction
rather than face high taxes and stiff regulation. By hypothesis, as
such movement becomes more costly, state regulation, at the mar-
gin, becomes less costly for the state. Given increasing movement
costs, each additional increment of regulation costs the state less
because some firms may elect to stay and face the higher taxes and
increased regulation rather than bear the costs of moving. In Pro-
fessor North's words:
The ruler always has rivals: competing states, or potential rulers
within his own state. . . . Where there are no close substitutes, an
existing ruler will be characterized as a despot, a dictator, or an
absolute monarch. The closer the substitutes, the fewer degrees of
freedom the ruler possesses, and the greater the percentage of in-
cremental income that will be retained by the constituents."
North's emphasis on the effect of competing regimes on the con-
figuration of legal rules provides an important reason why consti-
tutions are less likely than garden-variety legislation to exhibit ex-
ploitive characteristics. At the time constitutions are formed, rival
governments and competing forms of government are likely to pro-
vide citizens with an effective and meaningful choice of govern-
mental structure. The history of the United States Constitution is
a striking manifestation of this phenomenon. Today, laws may im-
pose large costs on the public before reaching the point at which
leaving for another country would be less costly than compliance.
By contrast, however, when the Constitution was being debated,
35 Id. at 252 ("The rivals are other states, as well as individuals within the existing politi-
cal-economic unit who are potential rulers. The degree of monopoly power of the ruler
therefore is a function of the closeness of substitute for the various groups of
constituents.").
36 See id. at 255 & n.5 (citing A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970)).
37 Id. at 255.
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there was a strong possibility that the states would not ratify the
document. Indeed, the main issue at the constitutional convention
was whether the states should form together into a proper national
government at all. Ratification was by no means assured when the
document was being formulated."
The purpose of the Philadelphia convention was to solve a num-
ber of serious problems that had arisen in the state legislatures
during the decade after the Revolution. The period in question was
marked by extraordinary economic expansion," and the propo-
nents of the Constitution argued that the current structure of gov-
ernment (i.e., the Articles of Confederation) had to be amended to
maintain this growth.40 As the defenders of the new regime repeat-
edly pointed out, capital formation would not be possible "if an
omnipotent legislature can set aside contracts ratified by the sanc-
tion of law."
'41
The state governments, however, were promulgating a rash of
laws that benefited only a narrow band of special interests, partic-
ularly debtor landholding interests. The "legislative department"
38 The reason The Federalist was written and circulated was to provide a forum in which
the authors and supporters of the Constitution could explain and defend the document. See
The Federalist, at viii (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (describing The Federalist as "only one of
several hundred salvos in the loud war of words that accompanied the protracted struggle
over ratification of the Constitution"). Professor Rossiter stated further:
[Few of the] authors and supporters [of the Constitution] imagined that it would be
easy to win such a margin of approval [nine of the thirteen states] in the chaotic
political circumstances of the world's first experiment in popular government over an
extended area; all recognized that a clear-cut vote against the Constitution in any one
of four key states would be enough by itself to destroy their hopes for "a more perfect
union."
Id.
3" M. Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation,
1781-1789, at 423-24 (1965).
40 G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 393-96 (1969).
41 Id. at 406 & n.22 (quoting from Rusticus, On Ex Post Facto Laws, 2 Am. Museum 169,
170 (1787)). The framers appealed to public stability and order in their defense of the new
constitutional government. As one author of The Federalist observed:
The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the
success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements.
What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce
when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be
executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement
given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance
that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an incon-
stant government?
The Federalist No. 62, at 381-82 (probably J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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in each state, as James Madison observed, was "everywhere ex-
tending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its
impetuous vortex. ' 42 The law promulgated by state legislatures, ac-
cording to Gordon Wood, was "becoming contemptible in the eyes
of those [prominent citizens and jurists] from whom it tradition-
ally should have commanded the greatest respect. '43 Thus, a key
complaint underlying the demand for a new form of government
was that the state governments were governing too much-not that
they were not governing enough. Unlike its rival state constitu-
tions, the new Constitution was designed to protect the rights of
ordinary citizens from the state legislatures, dominated by interest
groups, which were choking off the economic life of the states.
In sum, the history of the birth of the Constitution is consistent
with Professor North's argument regarding the effect that rivalrous
competition has on political outcomes. The adoption of the Consti-
tution was marked by a strong and informed debate over which of
a number of forms of government would best maximize the welfare
of the people. Such competition at the time of constitutional for-
mation is more likely to produce a government that deprives the
ruler of discretion and permits a greater percentage of wealth to be
retained by the constituents to whom it belongs.44
This discussion merely provides an explanation, in terms famil-
iar to the economist, of what Professor Bruce Ackerman has de-
scribed as "constitutional moments," those "rare periods of height-
ened political consciousness" when private citizens appear to rise
up in a communitarian collectivity to press for laws that benefit
society as a whole rather than narrow economic interests.45 Acker-
man has attributed the existence of constitutional moments to
42 The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also R. McCor-
mick, Experiment in Independence: New Jersey in the Critical Period, 1781-1789, at 183
(1950) (state legislation was "founded not upon the principles of Justice, but. . . upon the
Right of the Sword").
43 G. Wood, supra note 40, at 406.
11 See North, supra note 34, at 255. The use of the term "belongs" adopts John Locke's
conception of property rights, which posited that people rightfully acquire ownership of
property by mixing their labor with property that was previously unowned. J. Locke, Two
Treatises of Government 328-29 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d ed. 1698); see also Sanders,
Justice and the Initial Acquisition of Property, 10 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 367, 369-76
(1987) (discussing the Lockean theory of property).
45 Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L. J. 1013, 1022
(1984).
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altruism and what he describes as "revolutionary wisdom."' 6 I
suggest, perhaps more realistically (and certainly more cynically),
that rational self-interest-utility maximization, in economic
terms-leads to constitutional moments such as the one that oc-
curred in 1787.
Public choice theorists have strongly rejected this dualistic con-
ception of political life, which sharply differentiates "normal polit-
ics" from "constitutional politics.' 47 The current public choice par-
adigm draws no distinction between times of ordinary politics,
when interest groups pursue their own narrow ends, and constitu-
tional moments, when the collective action problems that ordina-
rily thwart the public interest can be overcome and legislation that
effects wealth transfers can be replaced by legislation that instead
facilitates wealth creation.
4 8
II. RAISING TRANSACTION COSTS: THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONS IN
A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY
Having placed the existence of constitutional moments in eco-
nomic terms, we must examine the likely goals of the drafters of a
public-regarding constitution. Again an economic model will prove
useful.
Perhaps the most fundamental precept of microeconomic theory
is that people act as rational, utility-maximizing individuals. This
model guided the framers of the United States Constitution as
well. Daniel Patrick Moynihan has observed that at the constitu-
tional convention of 1787, a government was founded on "scientific
46 Id. at 1020.
47 Id. at 1022.
48 See, e.g., Crain & Tolison, Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Perspective, 8
J. Legal Stud. 165 (1979); Crain & Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group
Theory of Government, 8 J. Legal Stud. 555 (1979) [hereinafter Crain & Tollison, The Exec-
utive Branch]; Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspec-
tive, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975).
A quotation from Robert Tollison illustrates public choice's failure to distinguish between
ordinary legislation and constitutional provisions:
[C]onstitutional provisions [are seen] as legislation of a higher order. Constitutional
provisions are worth more than normal legislation to interest groups because they are
more durable (i.e., harder to repeal), but they are also more costly to obtain because
of stricter procedures required for passage (e.g., higher voting rules and a public
referendum).
Tollison, supra note 3, at 346 (discussing Landes & Posner, supra) (citation omitted).
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principles,' 49 but Moynihan's observation can be made more pre-
cise. The scientific principles upon which the new American gov-
ernment was formed were in fact economic principles fully consis-
tent with the assumptions that drive the modern economic theory
of legislation. Specifically, the drafters of the Constitution desired
to create a system of government that would operate under the
novel assumption that, in the ordinary course of human affairs,
neither the governors nor the governed could be expected to be
altruistic, other-regarding beings. Rather, as Irving Kristol has ob-
served, the Constitution reveals "a 'realistic' view of human na-
ture-i.e., a view that is more alert to the absence of human vir-
tues than to their presence, a view that is skeptical of the ability of
human beings to govern themselves without the prior imposition of
severe institutional self-restraints. ' 50 According to Martin Dia-
mond, at the time they drafted the Constitution, the framers took
a skeptical view of human nature:
Ancient and medieval thought and practice were said to have failed
disastrously by clinging to illusions regarding how men ought to be.
Instead, the new science would take man as he actually is, would
accept as primary in his nature the self-interestedness and passion
displayed by all men everywhere and, precisely on that basis,
would work out decent political solutions.51
Thus, consistent with basic economic principles, the framers of
the Constitution assumed they were establishing a system of gov-
ernment that would guide the affairs of rational, highly self-inter-
ested economic actors who would be governed by other equally
self-interested individuals. As the citations above indicate, this
point is by no means obscure to those who have studied the per-
spectives of the framers. What is not so well understood is the
" Moynihan, The "New Science of Politics" and the Old Art of Government, 86 Pub.
Interest 22, 22 (1987).
" Kristol, "The Spirit of '87," 86 Pub. Interest 3, 3 (1987); see also Ackerman, supra note
45, at 1020 ("The Federalist's task is to construct the constitutional foundations for a dif-
ferent kind of politics-where well-organized groups try to manipulate government in pur-
suit of their narrow interests."); Malbin, Factions and Incentives in Congress, 86 Pub. Inter-
est 91, 92 (1987) (discussing federalists' desire to promote diversification of private interests
and competition among private interests).
5 This passage appears with attribution, but without citation, in Moynihan, supra note
49, at 23; see also Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in The Moral Founda-
tions of the American Republic 46 (R. Horwitz 2d ed. 1979) (making a similar point).
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mechanism by which the framers translated their notions of
human behavior into a constitutional framework.
This historical inquiry raises three important questions for the
application of public choice theory to constitutional analysis. First,
what, if anything, can constitutions do to constrain the rent-seek-
ing activity that is bound to follow the initial enactment of even
the most public-regarding constitution? Second, is it possible to
develop a constitutional framework that will eliminate rent-seek-
ing? If, as will be argued, it is not possible or desirable to eliminate
rent-seeking, what determines the "optimal" level of rent-seeking
activity within a society? The answer to this question raises the
issue of how one develops a normative framework for evaluating a
constitution. Finally, what light does this normative framework
throw on the question of whether the Constitution is performing as
it was intended-i.e., is it controlling interest group politics? The
following Sections address these questions.
A. What Constitutions Can Do About Rent-Seeking:
Two Strategies
Constitutional drafters can employ two strategies to improve the
quality of political life in the post-constitutional era. The first is to
establish a set of incentives for political actors that provide them
with self-interested reasons to refrain from engaging in wealth-re-
ducing political activities. In other words, by assuming that public
officials often will act out of self-interest,52 those who draft a con-
stitution can attempt to design a system that will channel the in-
centives of such officials in directions that are consistent with the
public interest rather than with special interests. The second strat-
egy that constitutional drafters can employ is to design a constitu-
tional system that raises the costs of interest group activity in the
post-constitutional era. By raising the costs of influencing political
outcomes, such a constitutional scheme would reduce the incidence
of rent-seeking activities and thus increase societal wealth.
1. Creating Incentives
The problem facing constitutional drafters in creating the proper
set of incentives for subsequent political actors closely parallels the
61 See Malbin, supra note 50, at 92.
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conflict that arises from the "separation of ownership and control"
in a large, publicly held corporation.5 3 Specifically, corporate man-
agers and directors can be likened to bureaucrats and legislators in
that they are agents of a large, diverse, and disorganized group of
principals. This organizational structure leads to a divergence of
interests between the principals and agents. Recent theoretical and
empirical research in the area of corporate finance suggests, how-
ever, that different firms encounter different degrees of managerial
divergence, depending on a wide array of variables. For example, a
firm that is a ripe target for an external hostile takeover is likely to
experience less divergence between shareholder interests and man-
agerial interests than a firm that is insulated from all threats of
outside influence. 4 Managers are likely to attempt to maximize
share value (i.e., act in shareholders' interests) to retain their jobs
when their control of the corporation is realistically threatened. 5
Similarly, when the product markets in which a firm competes are
strongly competitive, managers find shirking more difficult. 6
In applying these lessons from corporate finance to political the-
ory, one reaches conclusions identical to those of Professor North.
That is, where there is competition among providers of legal rules,
political leaders are constrained in the sorts of rules they can cre-
ate.57 This phenomenon was discussed above in the context of the
incentives that face constitutional actors at the time they are
drafting a constitution. A constitution is likely to be more public-
regarding if the drafters face competition from those with different
constitutional visions. Similarly, constitutional drafters may wish
51 The notion of the "separation of ownership and control" in the large, publicly held
corporation was popularized by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. See A. Berle & G. Means,
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). For a sampling of the literature, see
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980); Fama &
Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & Econ. 327 (1983); Fama & Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Williamson, Organiza-
tional Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 351 (1983).
54 See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1168-75 (1981); Haddock, Macey & McChesney,
Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701, 701-02
(1987).
5 See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110, 112-
13 (1965).
58 See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J. Legal Stud. 251, 262-64 (1977).
57 See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
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to establish a regime that fosters competition among political ac-
tors in the post-constitutional era, to provide incentives for politi-
cians to refrain from activities that are contrary to the interests of
their constituents.
Although constitutional drafters can design a system that fosters
competition and thus provides incentives for political actors to act
in ways that benefit their constituents, it is difficult to imagine a
constitutional regime that would replicate the competitive situa-
tion found in the market for corporate control. In some respects,
political parties represent competing firms. To achieve control of
the apparatus of government, political parties compete in offering
attractive platforms to voting coalitions. Just as experts in corpo-
rate finance have recognized that the market for corporate control
pits rival management teams against one another in a bidding war
for control of the corporate enterprise, 5s so too do political elec-
tions pit rival political teams against one another in a struggle to
control the machinery of the state.
Although this last analogy appears to be apt, in fact, the compe-
tition between political parties and the competition in the market
for corporate control significantly differ. The problem is one of in-
formation costs. Shareholders of firms can easily evaluate compet-
ing tender offers for their shares; their shares are traded publicly
and have a readily ascertainable market price. The management
team that places the highest value on the right to manage the tar-
get firm will be the one that can manage the firm most effectively.
This team is in a position to outbid other firms for the right to
control the resources of the target firm.
By contrast, voters cannot inexpensively ascertain the value of
rival political parties. Voters face a massive free-rider problem that
provides a disincentive to invest resources in searching for infor-
mation about rival political actors. All of the costs of such a search
are borne by the citizens who conduct the search, while the bene-
fits are shared among all members of the polity.59 Competition
among political parties, therefore, is not likely to have the same
" See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11
J. Fin. Econ. 5, 6 (1983) ("We view the market for corporate control, often referred to as the
takeover market, as a market in which alternate managerial teams compete for the rights to
manage corporate resources.").
" See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
16 (1971).
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beneficial effect on the governmental process as competition
among bidders has in the market for corporate control.
Paradoxically, the problem of obtaining access to reliable infor-
mation about political functionaries may be so great that increased
competition in the political sphere may lead to more, rather than
less, rent-seeking activity. Political parties, recognizing the phe-
nomenon of voter apathy due to rational ignorance, compete for
the right to divert resources from the general population to those
interest groups most adept at overcoming the free-rider problem.
Politicians acquiesce because they recognize that pursuing this
strategy brings them far more political success, in the form of in-
terest group support, than it costs them in mass constituent sup-
port. The politician who can make the most credible promises to
deliver legislative favors to effective interest groups will win. In
this way, rent-seeking becomes the dominant form of political ex-
pression in times of ordinary politics. Politicians who adopt alter-
native strategies (such as pursuing a policy of maximizing social
welfare) lack sufficient political support and ultimately will be
driven from the political market through a classic Darwinian mar-
ket process.
As Professor Tollison has observed, the role of the politician in
this model is that of a broker.60 The politician matches those who
are in a position to pay the most for interest group legislation with
those who are in the worst position to object to it.6 1 Those who are
able to pay the most for legislation become the beneficiaries of the
resulting wealth transfer, and those who are least able to object
become the (often unwitting) bearers of the resulting burden.
Thus, competition among individual politicians and political par-
ties is unlikely to generate an effective constraint on interest group
activity.
62
60 Tollison, supra note 3, at 343.
61 Id.
62 Casual empiricism provides support for this conclusion. Increasing the number of polit-
ical parties appears to increase rather than decrease the level of interest group activity
within a country. For example, Israel and Italy have numerous political parties, and both
countries have experienced high levels of factionalism and interest group transfer activity in
the past decades. Such activity has resulted in significant periods of hyperinflation. On the
other hand, as Gordon Tullock has pointed out, countries with only one political party (i.e.,
dictatorships) also experience extremely high rates of interest group transfer activity. Tul-
lock, Industrial Organization and Rent Seeking in Dictatorships, 142 Zeitschrift fUr die
Gesampte Staatswissenschaft (J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ.) 4 (1986). This analysis
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If rivalrous competition among political parties is not an effec-
tive mechanism for encouraging politicians to act in the public in-
terest, perhaps more direct incentive schemes hold more promise.
To take another lesson from corporate finance, executives and di-
rectors commonly have a large portion of their compensation pack-
ages tied directly to the performance of the firms for which they
work." The absence of a pricing system by which to measure polit-
ical performance, however, renders such a straightforward applica-
tion of corporate finance principles to the political context
unfeasible.
For example, compensation levels for executives are typically
linked to share price performance, because the share price reflects
both the current, observable performance of the firm and expecta-
tions about the firm's future performance (discounted to present
value). Thus, those with an interest in a particular firm can easily
monitor the firm's present performance and its expected future
performance. No analogous measure of a politician's performance
exists, however, and this lack of any appropriate benchmark for
measuring and monitoring political performance is one of the pri-
mary justifications for adopting a political regime that replaces
governmental decisionmaking with the private ordering of the
marketplace.
Conceivably, elected officials could be compensated based on the
growth in gross national product (GNP). Unlike share prices, how-
ever, the GNP measures only current output. Such a compensation
scheme would provide strong incentives for politicians to favor
short-term growth at the expense of long-term considerations. To
maximize their wealth, politicians might sacrifice investments in
projects with long-term benefits, such as developing and maintain-
ing the infrastructure of highways and bridges or providing for na-
tional defense, in favor of investment strategies that would pro-
duce short-term growth in the GNP.
leads to the conclusion that the optimal number of rival political parties may be small. Of
course, a dictator's ability to impose his will on the people will be greatly affected by the
number of substitutes for his services; potential competition in dictatorships comes in the
form of coups d'6tat. See id. at 11 (describing the overthrow of the dictator of Sudan when
he raised subsidized food prices).
63 See Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence,
9 Del. J. Corp. L. 540, 554 (1984).
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Similarly, the compensation of elected officials could be linked
to the level of unemployment: paying more to the ruling political
party when unemployment rates were low, and perhaps imposing
sanctions when unemployment rates were high. Besides the obvi-
ous problems of distinguishing the performance of individual polit-
ical actors, such a policy could produce perverse incentives for pol-
iticians and could lead to disastrous results. Specifically, linking
compensation to the level of employment would provide political
actors with little incentive to pursue important goals such as com-
bating inflation, while it would provide them with strong incen-
tives to increase the size of debt-financed governmental spending
to keep employment levels high.
In sum, apart from providing for competition among governmen-
tal jurisdictions by permitting firms and individuals to move freely
from one jurisdiction to another, the standard strategies used in
corporate governance for providing incentive mechanisms to in-
duce optimal behavior within the firm cannot be replicated easily
in the political sphere. Unlike the corporate sphere, with its public
market for shares, nothing in the political realm provides outside
observers (i.e., the electorate) with a low-cost mechanism for ob-
serving and evaluating the performance of the relevant partici-
pants (i.e., elected officials). 4
" In a recent important article, Michael J. Malbin suggests that a constitutional system
that channels a legislator's political ambitions for greater power and higher office will tend
to induce legislators "to look beyond the immediate wishes of a local constituency." See
Malbin, supra note 50, at 95. The framers assumed that politicians act out of self-interest,
but they believed that institutions of government could be "shaped to encourage, control,
and then channel ambition toward politically desirable ends." Id. at 93. In Malbin's view,
the structure of the legislative system can be arranged so that political ambition forces poli-
ticians to seek the respect of their colleagues, and this desire for collegial respect is "an
important counterweight to constituency pressure for the ambitious politician." Id. at 95.
An added benefit of this sort of legislative framework is that it induces higher-quality candi-
dates to seek office. People who are unwilling to make the political concessions necessary to
prevail over rivals in unseemly local elections may enter the political arena if their political
futures will be in the hands of their peers, rather than their constituents.
Malbin uses this theory to justify and defend filling political offices by appointment or by
indirect election. Id. at 93-96. His theory, however, ignores the impact of logrolling on the
political process. Logrolling is simply the process of vote trading in which one legislator
agrees to support a particular law in exchange for another legislator's agreement to support
a different law. See D. Mueller, Public Choice 49-58 (1979). This sort of logrolling can lead
to too much government spending, see Tullock, Some Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J.
Pol. Econ. 571, 573 (1959), and to lower overall social welfare, see T. Lowi, The End of
Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority 146-56 (1969); Riker &
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Thus, the only viable way that a constitution can effectively
channel the incentives of ordinary political actors to behave in the
public interest is by setting up a competitive system of govern-
ance-within a federal scheme-and by making exit relatively
easy. This method of providing incentives, however, permits a gov-
ernment to impose costs on its constituency up to the point at
which such costs become greater than the costs of moving to an-
other jurisdiction. The presence of location-specific investments by
particular constituents suggests that a local government can expro-
priate large amounts of rents before it becomes advantageous for
those constituents to move. 5 As Fred McChesney recently ob-
served, the possibilities of such expropriation must ultimately lead
to a lower level of initial investments.6
2. Raising the Costs of Interest Group Activity
Because of the structural problems inherent in designing a con-
stitutional system that provides the right set of incentives for legis-
lators, incentive-based systems are not likely to mitigate the
problems of interest group rent-seeking. Fortunately, a constitu-
tional system that raises the costs of interest group activity holds
more promise for constraining rent-seeking on the part of interest
groups during times of ordinary politics.
A basic presumption of the economic theory of legislation is
that, all else equal, increasing levels of expenditures by an interest
Brains, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1235, 1236 (1973), although the
results are arguably indeterminate, see D. Mueller, supra, at 50-58. Thus, so long as elected
officials must cater to the whims of their local (interest group) constituencies, removing
democratic processes from the structure of government is unlikely to produce beneficial re-
sults. The elected officials simply will demand that the officials they appoint do as they are
told, under the threat of removal from office. This logrolling behavior will undermine any
benefits of insulating public officials from the vagaries of elections.
In other words, Malbin is mistaken when he suggests that "[c]oncem for the respect of
one's colleagues," coupled with ambition for higher office, will prompt indirectly elected
officials to ignore the wishes of narrowly focused constituency groups, see Malbin, supra
note 50, at 95, because he ignores the likelihood that such indirectly elected officials will
adopt the interests of their benefactors' constituents as their own in order to advance. If, as
seems likely, advancement is not realistically possible for a majority of indirectly elected
officials, then Malbin's analysis is even more suspect. In those cases, there is no way to
predict how such officials will respond, and to assume that they, like beneficent dictators,
will act in the public interest seems naive in the extreme.
11 Cf. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Com-
petitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978) (discussing post-contractual oppor-
tunistic behavior after a specific investment is made).
66 See McChesney, supra note 26, at 108.
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group on a particular issue increase that group's influence on that
issue.6 7 The structure of government, however, greatly affects the
marginal price that an interest group must pay to obtain the pas-
sage of a particular statute. Thus, constitutional drafters who are
concerned about the welfare-reducing influence of special interest
groups can design a governmental structure that makes it rela-
tively costly to obtain passage of a statute.
A venerable and straightforward application of the notion that
altering the structure of government can affect the cost and thus
the production function of legislation was offered by Montes-
quieu 8 Montesquieu argued that a separation of powers between
the various functions of government would control governmental
abuse by providing a check on the lawmaking ability of rival
branches. The principle of separation of powers, advocated by
Montesquieu and incorporated in many governmental organiza-
tional structures, is a way of increasing the costs to discrete special
interest groups of achieving their legislative goals. Establishing a
system of government with a separation of powers not only raises
the equilibrium price for obtaining passage of a law, it also imposes
varying costs on different interest groups, depending on the char-
acteristics of each group and the nature of the legislation.
Every statute has a different effect and will meet with varying
degrees of support and opposition from rival interest groups. As
support from other groups increases, the costs to a single group of
obtaining passage go down, and as opposition increases, the costs
go up. Similarly, different groups display varying degrees of effi-
ciency in exerting legislative influence. Relatively small groups and
those otherwise able to control the free-riding behavior of members
can obtain legislation at a lower average cost than other groups. As
McCormick and Tollison explain the situation, "every piece of leg-
islation will have a different demand and supply function so that
67 R. McCormick & R. Tollison, supra note 8, at 30-31.
68 See C. de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 151-52 (T. Nugent trans. 1949) (1748)
(discussing the value of a separation of powers). Ample evidence contemporary with the
drafting of the Constitution suggests that Montesquieu's ideas greatly influenced the fram-
ers. See The Federalist No. 9, at 76 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (quoting Montes-
quieu); The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (citing Montesquieu); The Federalist No.
78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (quoting Montesquieu).
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practically speaking, each legislative transaction will carry a sepa-
rate price. '
Establishing several independent branches of government that
can block or impede the enactments of rival branches is a means of
raising the cost of obtaining legislative enactments for all groups.
If a two-thirds vote must be obtained in one elected body to over-
ride the veto of the executive, for example, the costs to an interest
group of obtaining passage of a statute of which the executive dis-
approves must also go up. Similarly, if a third branch of govern-
ment can invalidate or misconstrue (either intentionally or unin-
tentionally) a legislative enactment, then the expected benefit of a
statute is necessarily decreased.70
In sum, then, the classical justification for the separation of pow-
ers is that it raises the cost of special interest legislation by lower-
ing the probability of its ultimately becoming law. This classical
view, which I wish to resurrect, is recorded both in The Federal-
isPt ' and in Buchanan and Tullock's now-famous book, The
Calculus of Consent.7 2 As the separation of powers theory is es-
poused in these sources, judicial review and the executive veto are
mechanisms that raise the costs of legislative enactments that do
not meet the approval of a majority of voters, for they raise the
minimum size of the logrolling coalitions required for passage. Al-
though all of this may appear rather obvious to lawyers and politi-
cal scientists, the theory of separation of powers as it relates to the
interest group theory of legislation is worth noting in some detail,
because it conflicts with the dominant paradigm that exists in the
economic theory of legislation today.
The current public choice paradigm views the independent, sep-
arate branches of government as mechanisms for facilitating rather
than impeding interest group activity, because they enhance the
durability of the laws passed by the enacting legislature. 3 In the
69 R. McCormick & R. Tollison, supra note 8, at 31.
70 See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation, supra note 33, at 253-54.
71 See The Federalist No. 73 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (describing the value of
the executive veto); The Federalist No. 78, at 468 (A. Hamilton) (describing the value of
judicial review).
72 J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 3, at 248.
73 See Crain & Tollison, The Executive Branch, supra note 48, at 560-61 (applying
Landes and Posner's model to the executive veto); Landes & Posner, supra note 48 (describ-
ing the process as it applies to the judiciary).
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words of Professors Crain and Tollison, if their approach and that
of Professor Landes and Judge Posner is correct, it "undermines
any semblance of a separation-of-powers argument in favor of [a]
tripartite system of government .... [W]e have not a separation
but a collusion of powers in our governmental system. 7 4 The cur-
rent argument begins with the uncontroversial assumption that the
value to a special interest group of achieving passage of a particu-
lar statute depends, in large part, on how durable the legislative
protection is expected to be. An interest group will not offer much
political support for a statute that it expects to be overturned in
the near future.
Landes and Posner then argue that establishing an independent
judiciary (i.e., one in which judges enjoy life tenure) increases the
durability of interest group bargains because judges rarely hold
laws unconstitutional and because judicial custom and concern for
professionalism cause judges to attempt to interpret laws consist-
ently with the congressional intent.7 5 This argument, however,
seems highly implausible to lawyers who have studied judicial
opinions. In the process of applying basic tenets of statutory inter-
pretation, judges often systematically undo the special interest
bargains that legislatures have enacted.76 An especially glaring
omission in the Landes and Posner theory is an explanation for
why judges have any incentive to reduce overall societal wealth (in-
cluding their own) by enforcing interest group deals in which they
do not benefit at all.
In his article for this Symposium, Professor Tollison recognizes
this problem in the current wisdom and attempts to answer it. Tol-
lison claims that, because the judicial branch receives its salaries
and budgets from the legislative branch, the judiciary directly ben-
efits through increased salaries and budgets when it acts to sustain
the durability of interest group legislation.77 This explanation,
however, is inconsistent with the very theory it purports to defend:
Tollison is attempting to support the theory that judges' indepen-
dence increases the durability of interest group bargains by argu-
ing that judges are not independent due to their reliance on the
" Crain & Tollison, The Executive Branch, supra note 48, at 561.
711 Landes & Posner, supra note 48, at 879, 885-87.
"6 See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation, supra note 33.
7' Tollison, supra note 3, at 345-46.
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legislative branch for salary and budget increases. Moreover, if
Tollison's explanation is correct, we would expect to see indepen-
dent judges upholding the legislative enactments of the current
members of the legislature to curry favor and gain salary increases,
but overturning the enactments of previous legislatures, as judges
have little to gain by preserving those earlier enactments.
Tollison's model simply does not describe the pattern of durabil-
ity that current public choice theory predicts. Indeed, the Landes
and Posner theory posits that an independent judiciary increases
the durability of interest group deals because judges do not de-
pend on the current legislature for their salaries. In other words,
either the judiciary is independent or it is not. Professor Tollison
argues that an independent judiciary provides durability for inter-
est group deals because it is dependent on the legislature. Thus,
his argument in support of Landes and Posner is a refutation of
the very thesis it attempts to defend.
An additional reason why the Landes and Posner view (as re-
fined by Tollison) is likely to be incorrect is that, unlike other eco-
nomic actors, judges' salaries are not fixed individually. Judges on
the same court all earn the same salary and are entitled to identi-
cal benefits. As a consequence, judges are in a classic "prisoner's
dilemma ' 78 with respect to one another when it comes to approv-
ing legislation designed to curry favor with current legislators. If
judges could coordinate their actions, perhaps they would behave
as Tollison suggests-i.e., enforce the durability of legislative deals.
By following a rational "maxi-min" decision rule,7 9 however, it is
unlikely that a diverse and geographically separated group of fed-
" The phenomenon, known as the "prisoner's dilemma," is a subset of the economic
study of individual behavior in the face of uncertainty; it "is the prototype for many eco-
nomic problems in which individual rationality in an uncertain situation can lead to an
outcome that is completely irrational." W. Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory 165-66 (2d ed.
1978). Acting in concert, each individual could have been made better off. Due to high infor-
mational costs or the costs of collective behavior, however, each individual will follow his
own rational self-interest and therefore decide "on a course of action that is in a larger sense
irrational." Id. at 165.
" This rule entails maximizing the chances of obtaining the best possible result under a
certain set of constraints while minimizing the chances of obtaining the worst possible re-
sult. See J. Henderson & R. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory 213-16 (3d ed. 1980); see also
W. Nicholson, supra note 78, at 166-67 ("This rule states that the individual should choose
that strategy for which the minimum possible return is the greatest. This rule is basically a
pessimistic one which implicitly assumes that the worst will happen no matter which strat-
egy is chosen.").
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eral judges will act in the interest of judges as a whole by neglect-
ing their own preferences when deciding a case, and substituting
the preferences of the legislature for their own."0
Were judges simply to validate the interest group bargains, their
total costs would likely outweigh any immediate, remunerative
gains. The reason is two-fold. First, when a judge is construing a
federal statute, his decision will have an immediate and perhaps
significant effect on his own utility. Colleagues and academics will
be quick to chastise him for a silly or erroneous decision validating
or extending a pernicious interest group bargain; the benefit to the
judge from such a validation or extension in terms of increased sal-
ary and budget is, however, likely to be remote. Second, if other
judges are generating outcomes that the legislature finds congenial,
then punishing the recalcitrant judge requires punishing the com-
pliant judges as well, because judicial salaries and benefits are ad-
justed uniformly. This creates an incentive for a judge to attempt
to maximize his own utility when deciding cases, hoping that his
colleagues will bear the costs of being pawns of the legislature. The
fact that most judges are likely to consider this to be their optimal
strategy results in the prisoner's dilemma and strips the Tollison
analysis of its vitality.
In another application of the Landes and Posner analysis, Crain
and Tollison contend that the nullification of a law by a judge is
precisely analogous to the casting of a veto by a chief executive.,
They note that in both cases the legislature is generally unlikely to
reverse successfully the actions of the other branch.2 Nonetheless,
consistent with the Landes and Posner view of the judiciary, Crain
and Tollison argue that the executive veto enhances the returns
from legislative bargains with special interest groups by improving
their durability."3
so The reference in the text to the preferences of judges is meant to suggest only that
judges maximize their own utility when they decide cases; it is not meant to imply that
judges act selfishly or willfully. Indeed, over a wide range of issues, judges are more likely to
maximize their utility by maximizing their prestige within the academic and judicial com-
munities and by maximizing their self-image and sense of self-worth. When judges maximize
along these utility vectors, they are likely to generate decisions entirely consonant with what
is commonly viewed as the public interest.
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Though Crain and Tollison are correct that the presence of the
executive veto increases the difficulty of repealing legislation once
it is enacted, one cannot jump from this observation to the conclu-
sion that executive vetoes increase the value of interest group leg-
islation. Vesting the executive with veto power not only makes re-
pealing legislation more difficult, it also makes passage of
legislation more difficult to obtain in the first place. Moreover, al-
though executive vetoes occur relatively infrequently, simply
counting the number of vetoes is not a good measure of their ef-
fect, because it does not take into account the fact that the pros-
pect of an executive veto dissuades interest groups from squander-
ing resources in attempts to gain passage of statutes that they
expect will be vetoed.
Even Crain and Tollison's empirical evidence appears to support
the view that both the executive veto and the independent judici-
ary raise the cost of rent-seeking. Using a cross-sectional analysis
of state governments, Crain and Tollison have found that the fre-
quency of executive vetoes increases as the size of the majority
within the legislature increases."" As Crain and Tollison note, how-
ever, the average cost of passing laws declines as the size of legisla-
tive majorities increases.8 5 As the cost of passing laws declines, of
course, the legislature passes more interest group legislation. Thus,
as a legislative majority grows larger, it becomes less costly for in-
terest groups to achieve passage of the legislation they favor. And,
consistent with the traditional, public interest theory of the execu-
tive veto, the data presented by Crain and Tollison indicate that
when this happens the incidence of executive vetoes goes up. In
other words, just as legislation becomes less costly for interest
groups because of a change in the size of the legislative majority,
the incidence of vetoes striking down the proposed enactments
goes up, thus restoring the previous balance.
The point of this discussion has been to defend the traditional
view of the separation of powers. This view holds that the separa-
8 Id. at 566.
Id. at 562 & n.18 (citing Crain & Tollison, Team Productivity in Politics, 2 Micropoli-
tics 111, 114-15 (1982)). Crain and Tollison illustrate this conclusion by analogizing a legis-
lative majority to the controlling interest in a publicly held corporation. A shareholder who
controls a large block of shares is better able to implement his corporate proposals; simi-
larly, a large legislative majority is more effective in passing legislation and blocking actions
by minority interests. See Crain & Tollison, supra, at 114.
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tion of governmental powers into judicial, executive, and legislative
branches raises, rather than lowers, the cost of interest group legis-
lation. The traditional model seems more plausible than the view
currently held by leading public choice theorists that the separa-
tion of powers is simply a subterfuge masking a collusion among
the various branches of government, thereby facilitating wealth
transfers from the public at large to discrete, well-organized special
interests.
Thus, those constitutional drafters interested in designing a gov-
ernmental structure to impede rent-seeking will rely on the separa-
tion of powers as an integral part of their constitutional system. All
structural impediments to rent-seeking, however, are not the same.
Legislatures, for example, may be bicameral or unicameral, and the
other branches of government may display varying degrees of inde-
pendence. The remainder of this Section will explore these and
other more subtle aspects of a constitutional system of checks and
balances.
Wealth transfers to successful interest groups are inexorably
linked to the costs of obtaining such transfers. As the costs go up,
the level of transfer activity declines. An obvious example concerns
legislative size: as the size of the legislature goes up, it becomes less
expensive for the losers in the wealth transfer process to affect po-
litical outcomes.8 6 When the size of the legislature increases, inter-
est groups find that their influence (at any given level of expendi-
tures) correspondingly declines.8 7 Thus, constitutional drafters
88 R. McCormick & R. Tollison, supra note 8, at 34.
87 For several reasons, legislative size plays an important role in determining the ultimate
level of rent-seeking activity.
First, increasing legislative size increases the number of vote suppliers and reduces
the costs of influence or votes. Since in [the economic theory of legislation] . . . poli-
ticians are brokers between winners and losers in the wealth-transfer process, the
degree of competition in the legislative process will affect their brokerage fee . ..
[I]ncreases in house size will reduce the price of influence because of reduced monop-
oly power among suppliers. . . . Second, there is a perhaps more important effect of
legislative size due to the fact that larger legislatures mean smaller relative influence
for any individual legislator. . . . Larger legislatures are thus characterized by rela-
tively weak individual legislators, weak in the sense that the influence of any one of
them is likely to have a small impact on the income of a lobbying group. The third
reason .. . is that a larger legislature reduces the number of voters per legislator, and
this might lead to improved policing by voters. Another way of saying the same thing
is to argue that larger legislatures will more closely represent the entire citizenry, and
[Vol. 74:471
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interested in designing a constitutional system to reduce the inci-
dence of interest group transfer activity will construct a large legis-
lature. Of course, marginal conditions still hold, and at some point
the gains to society of reducing interest group activity will equal
the costs of maintaining a huge legislature.88 At this point, society
will have achieved the "optimal" amount of rent-seeking.
Another way to bolster the efficacy of a separation of powers is
to require that various elected officials appeal to different constit-
uencies for political support.89 For example, the nature of the un-
derlying transaction costs may be such that the representative of a
particular subdivision is easily influenced by a particular interest
group to support a particular statute. If influencing this legislator
is all the interest group has to do to prevail, the costs of interest
group influence will be very low. If, however, an interest group
must put together a large number of coalitions representing differ-
ent constituencies to influence political outcomes, the cost of ob-
taining such influence will increase. So, for example, where a gov-
ernment is structured so that the executive is elected from one set
(or subset) of voters, and legislators from a different set (or sets in
the case of a bicameral legislature), and judges from a third set,
the cost of influencing political outcomes will likely prove higher.
It is easy to see why this is so if we observe the interest group's
activities from the perspective of a single, political-support-maxi-
mizing regulator. This regulator may find that supporting a wealth
hence there will be a smaller level of wealth transfers supplied under these
circumstances.
Id. at 33-34 (citation omitted).
88 See id. at 13 n.9 ("Even though there is variation in legislative sizes, there is a remarka-
bly small band within which legislative sizes seem to fall. This follows quite easily from the
fact that transactions costs increase significantly as size increases in any group arrangement,
such as a legislature."). This theoretical and empirical result was anticipated by James
Madison. As Madison observed in The Federalist No. 10: "[H]owever small the republic
may be the representatives must be raised to a certain number in order to guard against the
cabals of a few; and that however large it may be they must be limited to a certain number
in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude." The Federalist No. 10, at 82 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). He wrote in the Federalist No. 58:
The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their represent-
atives beyond a certain limit they strengthen the barrier against the government of a
few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, after securing a
sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive
sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views by every addi-
tion to their representatives.
The Federalist No. 58, at 360 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
81 J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 3, at 233-48.
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transfer to a particular group is clearly to his political advantage.
A good example is the consistent support for tobacco subsidies
from senators from North Carolina. If the approval of these sena-
tors was the only action required to sustain such subsidies, the
subsidies might be even larger than they are at present. The re-
quirement that the senators from North Carolina must obtain a
majority vote of both houses of Congress (whose members come
from a wide variety of constituencies, most of which do not benefit
from such subsidies) and must avoid having their statute vetoed or
declared unconstitutional, substantially raises the cost of obtaining
such transfers.9 0
For related reasons, having a bicameral legislature with signifi-
cant differences in the size of the two houses also raises the price
to interest groups of obtaining favorable legislation."' As Mancur
Olson has shown, the cost of making collective decisions goes up in
a nonlinear fashion-the costs increase at a faster rate than the
growth in the size of the legislature.9 2 As a result, if the total size
of the legislature is held constant, increasing the size of one house
(with a concomitant decrease in the size of the other house) raises
the cost to an interest group of obtaining agreement in that house
by an amount that is greater than the group's savings in the other
house.9"
90 Indeed, only the logrolling ability of the senators from North Carolina and other to-
bacco states enables such legislation to be passed at all.
91 In addition, having a bicameral legislature is a low-cost device for implementing a sys-
tem of diverse representation that, as described above, serves to reduce the incidence of
special interest legislation. As James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock have observed:
[I]f the basis of representation can be made significantly different in the two houses,
the institution of the bicameral legislature may prove to be an effective means of
securing a substantial reduction in the expected external costs of collective action
without incurring as much added decision-making costs as a more inclusive rule
would involve in a single house.
J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 3, at 236.
92 M. Olson, supra note 59, at 53-65.
13 See R. McCormick & R. Tollison, supra note 8, at 44. Begin with the assumption of a
bicameral legislature consisting of a house and a senate. If there are 200 legislators equally
divided between the two houses, then an interest group must provide sufficient political
support to 51 people in each body to gain passage of a statute. Assume also that the statute
is not vetoed or subsequently declared to be unconstitutional. If the structure of govern-
ment is altered so that the senate has 40 members and the house has 160, the "logic of
collective action" dictates that the cost to the interest group of obtaining passage of its
statute will go up, because the increase in the cost of influencing the outcome in the house
will be greater than the decrease in the cost of influencing the outcome in the senate. In
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These structural mechanisms may appear to be a rather circui-
tous means to accomplish the constitutional goal of decreasing in-
terest group dominance. After all, "a shield of 'rights'-spheres of
individual autonomy into which government may not enter"' ,-
seems a more direct method to protect against the pernicious
wealth-transferring activity of organized interest groups. Guaran-
ties against invasions of privacy, impairment of private contractual
obligations, takings of private property, denial of equal protection
under the law, and discrimination against certain citizens by others
are all obvious candidates for inclusion in a constitution that tries,
by constitutional fiat, to protect society against the danger of in-
terest group domination of the political process.9
The problem with these constitutional directives, however, is
that, as compared to structural constitutional rules, they are likely
to be less effective as a means of controlling post-constitutional in-
terest group opportunism. First, unlike structural constitutional
rules, constitutional directives that forbid government officials
from doing certain things (such as interfering with private contrac-
tual relationships) are not self-executing. Rather, such directives
rely on an allegiance to vague constitutional principles and on the
exercise of self-restraint by the very self-interested officials the di-
rectives are designed to control. These rules therefore carry with
them the risk that they will be ignored when it is convenient for
officials to do so.
Second, constitutional directives require interpretation and
therefore are subject to manipulation by interest groups and politi-
cians. Much of the scholarship of Professor Richard Epstein, who
clearly recognizes that the goal of a constitution is to control inter-
est group behavior, illustrates this point. Professor Epstein
presents a plausible argument that administrative agencies are
"flatly unconstitutional."" He also persuasively argues that the
other words, the cost of making collective decisions will, with the shift in the two houses'
sizes, increase in a nonlinear fashion-i.e., it will increase at an increasing rate. See M. O-
son, supra note 59, at 53-65.
94 Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 33 (1985).
'" See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1689-
91 (1984). Sunstein describes such constitutional provisions as "united by a common theme
and focused on a single underlying evil: the distribution of resources or opportunities to one
group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw
political power to obtain what they want." Id. at 1689.
" Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. Legal Educ. 153, 156 (1987).
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constitutional principle of substantive due process, 7 the constitu-
tional prohibition against takings of private property without just
compensation,9" and the constitutional prohibition against impair-
ment of contractual obligations99 might be extremely important
constitutional bulwarks against interest group malfeasance; but, as
he himself observes, many of these safeguards have long been
ignored.
Such decidedly normative views of constitutional language, even
assuming that they are correct, demonstrate the malleability of
such directives in the face of interest group pressures and changing
circumstances. 00 In the face of decisionmakers' ability to devise
creative interpretations of text, it is a weak constitution that relies
on lawyers and constitutional historians to restrain the wealth-
transferring activities of interest groups merely by pointing to con-
stitutional language and saying, "See, the Constitution says you
must do this or refrain from doing that."
This Section has examined two primary strategies for controlling
interest group activity. The first, providing incentives for govern-
ment officials to behave in public-regarding ways, is not a particu-
larly hopeful approach because of the lack of an observable mea-
sure of reward or punishment. The only successful means to
provide incentives is to structure a system of competition among
providers of governmental services and to permit citizens to choose
freely among them.
The second strategy for controlling interest group activity is to
raise the costs to interest groups of influencing political outcomes;
this strategy can be divided into two components. The first compo-
nent consists of structuring the organization of government so as to
raise the costs to interest groups of obtaining favorable decisions
from the government. This method of constitutional design ap-
pears to hold significant promise as a means of controlling interest
Id. at 158.
" R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 7-31 (1985).
" Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 714-15
(1984).
"00 An excellent demonstration of the point is contained in Professor Epstein's description
of the interest group dynamics underlying New York's maximum-hour legislation that led to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which held such
legislation unconstitutional. Epstein demonstrates that the statute represented the success-
ful attempt by certain interest groups to impose disproportionate burdens upon rival firms
by disrupting their ways of doing business. See Epstein, supra note 99, at 732-34.
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group activity. The second component involves drafting constitu-
tional directives and prohibitions that protect the interests of the
general public by directing lawmakers to respect individual rights.
Rules of this type do not hold much promise as a means of restrict-
ing post-constitutional interest group behavior, because they re-
quire enforcement by political officials during times of normal
politics. This, in essence, is tantamount to relying on the fox to
guard the henhouse.
B. Applying the Model: Determining the Optimal Level of
Rent-Seeking Within a Society
The exercise of raw political power to obtain legislation that
benefits the politically powerful at the expense of the politically
weak is "an underlying evil" '101 that a well-functioning constitu-
tional system should be designed to correct. The same economic
incentives that lead to the wealth-transferring activities of interest
groups in day-to-day political life are likely to lead such groups to
attempt to design a constitutional scheme that increases societal
wealth by reducing the incidence of such transfers.
If, however, interest group wealth transfers are bad, why do well-
drafted constitutions not eliminate the evil completely, rather
than merely mitigating it? The answer is simple: it is not costless
for a society to eliminate interest group wealth transfers, and the
cost of eliminating such transfers will determine the optimal level
of transfer activity within a society. Curtailing wealth-reducing ac-
tivity by interest groups is efficient only up to the point at which
the gains from such a reduction equal the costs of attaining the
reduction.
One cost of reducing wealth transfer activities is the cost of gov-
ernment itself.02 As the discussion of the value of a separation of
101 See Sunstein, supra note 95, at 1689.
102 The way to eliminate completely the burden of wealth transfer activity is to eliminate
the government itself. The discussion in the text makes the assumption that by taking an
economic approach to the Constitution, the benefits of government can be made to outweigh
the costs. The benefits of government include solving collective action and free-rider
problems, as well as providing public goods such as national defense. This discussion is not
meant to suggest that in all cases the benefits of government outweigh the costs. Indeed, the
whole point of the economic theory of legislation is that the costs and benefits of govern-
ment do not fall evenly among the populace. Well-organized interest groups enjoy a dispro-
portionate share of the benefits, and poorly organized individuals and groups bear a dispro-
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powers indicated, by establishing a large bicameral legislature, a
constitution can raise the cost to interest groups of effecting perni-
cious wealth transfers.103 This analysis remains valid until it is ap-
plied to the limiting case at which all voters are in the legisla-
ture.'0 4 At some point, however, the incremental, marginal costs of
further enlarging the legislature will outweigh the marginal reduc-
tion in rent-seeking. 0 5
Another valuable mechanism for controlling rent-seeking is to
devise a constitutional structure that provides competition among
jurisdictions. Individuals benefit under such a scheme because the
interjurisdictional competition deters officials from pursuing poli-
cies that do not maximize aggregate preferences. 0 6 The mainte-
nance of such rival governments, again, is obviously not a costless
endeavor, and local governments will still exercise some monopoly
power over their constituents for two reasons. First, the efficacy of
jurisdictional competition depends on the ability of constituents to
"vote with their feet" by leaving jurisdictions with inefficient (or
oppressive) local governments. Exercising the right to leave a par-
ticular jurisdiction is not costless, however. The most obvious cost
is the actual cost of relocation, but other, more subtle burdens also
are likely to be quite large. For example, the burden to individual
citizens of discovering the costs being imposed by their local gov-
ernment and comparing them with the costs being imposed by ri-
val jurisdictions may be significant. This involves more than sim-
ply observing the tax and regulatory burdens imposed in rival
jurisdictions; it also involves assessing the benefits offered by the
portionate share of the costs. As usual, at the margins the analysis is difficult, and at the
limits it is easy.
103 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
... See R. McCormick & R. Tollison, supra note 8, at 34.
105 In fact, even in a political referendum-i.e., near-perfect democratic participa-
tion-interest groups still will exert a disproportionate influence on voting outcomes. See
Schneider & Naumann, Interest Groups in Democracies-How Influential Are They? An
Empirical Examination for Switzerland, 38 Pub. Choice 281, 293 (1982). Groups will have
more control over the agenda and more control over the dispersion of information about the
subject of the referendum because of the familiar free-rider problems facing the other
voters.
10I See Epple & Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does
Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 1197, 1198 (1981); Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 418-20 (1956).
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governmental services and entitlements in the various jurisdic-
tions, which is exceedingly difficult to do.1"7
An additional cost of jurisdictional competition is that it pro-
vides a disincentive for private individuals and firms to make loca-
tion-specific capital investments for fear that these investments
will be appropriated by the local government.108 In addition, as
Dennis Epple and Allan Zelenitz have noted, because land is not
mobile, local governments subject to jurisdictional competition can
still usurp some land rents for their own ends.109 As a consequence,
increased competition among jurisdictions cannot eliminate com-
pletely the ability of local governments to effect wealth transfers.
Thus, the traditional argument that jurisdictional competition
leads to the efficient production of public goods appears to be
overstated.110 Jurisdictional competition, as well as organizational
structure, is not a panacea; it is an efficient check on interest
group activities only up to the point at which its benefits are equal
to its costs.
Error costs due to the difficulty of distinguishing rent-seeking
from selfless behavior provide another reason why interest group
107 Seen in this perspective, the presence of jurisdictional competition seems to permit
easy identification of the groups likely to be exploited by regulation. Those groups less able
to migrate among particular jurisdictions will be subject to more exploitation than other
groups. See North, supra note 34, at 252 ("The state attempts to act like a discriminating
monopolist, separating each group of constituents and devising property rights for each so
as to maximize state revenue. . . . The degree of monopoly power of the ruler therefore is a
function of the closeness of substitute for the various groups of constituents."). Some empir-
ical evidence appears to support this hypothesis. See Cebula & Avery, The Tiebout Hypoth-
esis in the United States: An Analysis of Black Consumer Voters, 1970-75, 41 Pub. Choice
307, 307-08 (1983).
108 Cf. McChesney, supra note 26, at 108 (discussing expropriation by politicians as a gen-
eral disincentive to investment).
"I9 See Epple & Zelenitz, supra note 106, at 1216. The Epple and Zelenitz analysis as-
sumes that jurisdictional competition takes place along fixed boundaries, so that a firm or
individual must physically leave one jurisdiction to avoid the regulations of that jurisdiction.
Id. Though this assumption generally is true, it may not hold in every context. Corporations,
for example, may incorporate in jurisdictions with which they have no physical nexus. Some
commentators believe that this ability provides significant incentives for state governments
to develop laws of incorporation that benefit shareholders. See Winter, supra note 56, at
289. Even under these conditions, however, significant incentives exist for local interest
groups and governments to engage in inefficient wealth transfer activity. See Macey &
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469,
499-509 (1987).
11o See Epple & Zelenitz, supra note 106, at 1216; see also Tiebout, supra note 106, at 424
(making the original argument that competition would lead to efficient production of public
goods).
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manipulation of the political process cannot be eliminated com-
pletely. Merely because interest groups agitate in favor of a partic-
ular law or policy does not mean that the law or policy would not
serve some legitimate end of government. Merely because certain
interest groups supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for exam-
ple, does not mean that the statute serves only narrow private in-
terests.11' The better argument is that the statute, by making cer-
tain types of race-based economic discrimination illegal, opened
markets and thereby created a public good by reducing the inci-
dence of prior discrimination that clearly benefited certain groups
at the expense of others." 2
Similarly, the progressive income tax has been viewed both as a
statute driven by interest group pressures, designed to transfer
wealth from the disorganized rich to other, more politically power-
ful groups," 3 and as a means of maximizing social utility. 14 Rather
than being an example of rent-seeking, it is argued, the progressive
income tax scheme may serve the public interest by eliminating
free-rider problems that "might thwart private efforts to bring
about the level of transfers from rich to poor that the rich would
prefer." 15 In contrast, environmental protection statutes, which
appear to be classic public interest statutes designed to ensure the
optimal production of a public good (i.e., a clean environment),
often contain features consistent only with the protection of spe-
cial interests. 1 6
"I See W. Eskridge & P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the
Creation of Public Policy 4-28 (1987) (detailing the passage of the Civil Rights Act in
Congress).
112 Indeed, racial discrimination can itself be viewed as a form of interest group activity.
Discrimination against blacks increases the demand for the labor of certain groups of white
workers and simultaneously keeps the prices of certain products artificially low by retarding
demand. The consumers of those products, along with those who compete with blacks in the
workplace, are the true beneficiaries of racial discrimination. For similar examples of dis-
crimination on economic grounds, one need only look to the confiscation of the property of
Japanese-Americans, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), or to the
current efforts by American labor unions to ban aliens from the work force, see, e.g., Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
"I See M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 161-76 (1982).
114 See Posner, supra note 7, at 270-71; see also A. Lerner, The Economics of Control 238-
40 (1944) (arguing that a progressive tax does not discourage risky investments).
15 Posner, supra note 7, at 265.
16 See Pashigian, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and
Factor Shares, 27 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1984) (showing how certain regulations, ostensibly
designed to protect the environment, reduce competition and benefit larger industries by
imposing a disproportionate burden on small manufacturing firms).
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Furthermore, as Judge Frank Easterbrook has observed, most
statutes represent a mix of public interest principles and interest
group compromises. 117 The fact that such statutes serve dual pur-
poses makes distinguishing between the private interest provisions
and the public-regarding ones even more difficult. Relying on indi-
viduals (such as judges) to distinguish between the public and the
private interests does not provide any assurance that majoritarian
interests will be served by governmental action.
The structural devices designed to raise the costs of interest
group bargains'1 8 increase the costs of passing laws generally and
therefore raise the costs of all legislation. As a consequence, these
devices will impede the passage of some laws designed to serve the
public interest, as well as some laws designed to effect interest
group bargains. The opportunity cost to society of not having these
public interest measures enacted into law must be counted as one
of the costs of devising a system of checks and balances designed
to reduce rent-seeking.
Even assuming that constitutional drafters act with the best in-
tentions and on the basis of perfect information, all of these argu-
ments point to the conclusion that the optimal level of rent-
seeking in society will be greater than zero. A constitution can only
alter the political equilibrium to bring it closer to the point at
which rent-seeking becomes a positive sum game; a constitution
cannot-and ought not-completely eliminate such rent-seeking.
III. EVALUATING THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The dominant view among public choice theorists is that the
United States Constitution facilitates the political equilibrium
among interest groups and does not alter the interest group pro-
cess, except perhaps to facilitate it.119 As should be clear from the
preceding discussion, however, that analysis ignores a number of
structural features of the Constitution that appear specifically
designed to combat the problem of wealth transfers by interest
groups. The Constitution employs a bicameral legislature, with
houses of widely different sizes. The American constitutional sys-
117 Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 17.
"8 See supra notes 68-93 and accompanying text.
" See ToUison, supra note 19, at 55-59.
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tern also institutes a regime of checks and balances by creating
both a federal judiciary that is insulated from political pressure
because its judges have life tenure and salaries that cannot be re-
duced, and a federal executive with authority to veto acts of Con-
gress. In addition, each of the three branches of government must
appeal to different constituencies for political support, thereby fur-
ther reducing the power of interest groups to affect political out-
comes. Finally, the Constitution envisions a federal form of organi-
zation in which citizens are free to travel among the several states,
thereby reducing the incentives of individual states to engage in
transfer activities.
Each of these features of the Constitution provides independent
support for the hypothesis that the Constitution was designed to
impede rather than to facilitate rent-seeking. These provisions also
provide support for the hypothesis that a constitution, by its very
structure, establishes the political equilibrium within a polity by
fixing the level of transaction costs faced by interest groups that
attempt to obtain favorable legislation. By employing features that
raise the transaction costs of interest groups, the Constitution de-
creases the incidence of such activity.
Having said this, the question remains whether the Constitution
fixes the transaction costs facing interest groups at the optimal
level. If it does, then reducing the incidence of negative-sum inter-
est group activity in society would cost more than it is worth. Un-
fortunately, there are indications that this is not the case and that
some inefficient wealth transfers could be avoided, at a net gain,
under a revised constitutional regime.120 Potential improvements
to the existing constitutional regime can be divided into two cate-
gories. First, adjustments could be made in the current system to
make it constrain rent-seeking as was originally intended by the
framers. Second, new provisions could be added to the current sys-
tem to take account of changed circumstances.
It must be emphasized at the outset that the constitutional revi-
sions suggested here do not necessarily reflect mistakes in the cur-
rent system. The framers drafted the Constitution in a very differ-
120 The discussion that follows is not meant to imply that the Constitution ought to be
amended. The amendment process has its own perils, and the likelihood is great that inter-
est group pressures could take hold of the amendment process to produce a constitutional
framework inferior to the present one.
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ent environment from the one in which we live today.
Technological advancements have altered the complexion of inter-
est group politics: national political campaigns now are conducted
via television and direct mail; computers greatly facilitate the iden-
tification of individuals and groups affected by an interest group's
activities; and modern means of communication facilitate interest
group interaction and interest group access to the political process.
All of these relatively recent developments lower the transaction
costs that face interest groups attempting to organize and effect
wealth transfers. These developments have led to a huge prolifera-
tion in the number of interest groups, as well as to the refinement
of the goals of such groups. In other words, more interest groups
exist now than ever before, both in absolute numbers and in rela-
tion to the size of the population, and the goals of these groups are
focused more discretely than previously. These developments make
constitutional control of interest group activities more difficult.
A. Adjustments to the Current System
The existing constitutional regime describes the organization of
government and the separation of powers in exceedingly broad,
and often ambiguous, terms. The Constitution, for example, vests
legislative power in a Senate and a House of Representatives, 2'
but does not stipulate any of the details concerning the day-to-day
lawmaking procedures to be used within these legislative bodies. A
basic tenet of public choice theory, however, is that specification of
such details (e.g., voting procedures 122 ) can have a significant im-
pact on political outcomes.
The Constitution leaves to the House and Senate the details of
their voting procedures. Once legislation is proposed, because of
the bicameral nature of the Congress, approval by what is, in ef-
fect, a supermajority of the legislators is required to pass the stat-
ute.12 3 Thus, to some extent article I establishes a decisional pro-
121 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
122 The seminal work, of course, is Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values
(2d ed. 1963). For an excellent review of Arrow's original work, as well as a relatively acces-
sible discussion of the postulates and proof of Arrow's theorem, see D. Mueller, supra note
64, at 185-88; see also Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 Va. L. Rev.
561 (1977) (demonstrating the importance of agenda control and suggesting possible appli-
cations of public choice theory to judicial decisionmaking).
12 J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 3, at 232-48; see supra notes 89-93 and accom-
panying text (discussing the effect of bicameralism on interest group influence).
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cess that, by forestalling cyclical majorities, can yield coherent and
consistent legislative choices.
124
The procedures for considering proposed bills, however, are
much different today than they were during the period immedi-
ately following the ratification of the Constitution. In the early
days, "bills were considered and approved in principle by the Com-
mittee of the Whole before they were sent to a select committee to
be put into legislative language. ' 125 As a consequence, anyone who
wanted to propose a statute had to persuade a majority of the en-
tire legislature that the statute was worth pursuing, because delib-
eration by the entire body preceded markup by the specialists. 26
Today, of course, bills generally are reported out of committee
first and voted on by the House or Senate only after being dis-
cussed at the committee level. This process makes enacting stat-
utes easier, thus helping to ensure the passage of fringe statutes
that could not previously have obtained sufficient support or even
have made it onto the legislative agenda. In addition, the current
system facilitates logrolling, as committee members can easily take
part in political trading among themselves, thus ensuring that bills
reported out of committee have broad-based, bipartisan support, if
only because of the nature of the compromises reached at the com-
mittee level. Finally, the current system facilitates interest group
politics by making it cheaper for the interest groups affected by a
particular piece of legislation to identify ex ante the relevant legis-
lators to target regarding that legislation. By targeting their lobby-
ing efforts towards the members of the relevant committee, these
interest groups can economize greatly on lobbying costs.
Thus, specifying the structure of the deliberative process within
the branches of the legislature could improve the operation of gov-
ernment by further raising the costs to interest groups of obtaining
passage of legislation. Requiring consideration and approval of
statutes by a "Committee of the Whole" before sending them to
select committees would be a step in this direction.
124 See Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and
the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 Duke L.J. 948, 956.
125 Malbin, supra note 50, at 95.
12I Id. at 95-96.
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B. A New Suggestion
Perhaps the greatest departure from the system of government
envisioned by the framers is the open-ended delegation of legisla-
tive power to administrative agencies that began with the New
Deal and continues to this day. This delegation of lawmaking
power to administrative agencies bypasses the deliberative process
of our tripartite system of government and thereby facilitates the
ability of interest groups to obtain their desired ends by "captur-
ing" the very administrative agency designed to regulate them. In-
terest group capture of administrative agencies, however, is un-
usual. Agencies normally are created amid controversy and conflict
among competing interest groups, when legislators are uncertain
about the political costs and benefits of pursuing alternative
courses of action. In such circumstances, the optimal political deci-
sion for legislators is to delegate lawmaking or regulatory authority
to an administrative agency.
12 7
In other words, as Peter Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen
Robinson have observed, the ability to delegate broad lawmaking
power to administrative agencies often creates a "regulatory lot-
tery" 128 that simply relegates important policy decisions to the
highest interest group bidder and permits individual legislators to
avoid accountability for the consequences:
Legislators delegate authority [to administrative agencies] in order
to reduce various costs of legislating, which allows them to legislate
more private goods. Stated differently, delegation [of regulatory
authority, legislative authority, or both,] reduces the legislator's
marginal cost of private-goods production, which, ceteris paribus,
yields more legislation and more public-sector private-goods
production. 129
Though one can argue, as Professor Epstein and others have
done, that such broad delegations are unconstitutional,3 0 making
such an argument does not change the fact that such delegations
127 See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 58-60 (1982); see also Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process
or Administrative Process?, 39 Pub. Choice 33, 56-57 (1982) (applying Kenneth Shepsle's
analysis of risky electoral choices to the regulatory problem).
'z Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 127, at 60-61.
129 Id. at 56.
130 See Epstein, supra note 96, at 156; Mayton, supra note 124, at 964-65.
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have been taking place without successful challenge for more than
fifty years, despite the fact that agencies created under such broad
delegations have often failed to serve the public interest.131 The
very existence of such agencies is a glaring contradiction of the
carefully constructed lawmaking procedures articulated in article I,
which involve "the House, the Senate, and the presidency as three
separate members of a grand legislative committee. 1 3 2 In light of
this contradiction, it is highly unlikely that the framers would have
permitted the lawmaking procedures of article I to coexist with the
current system, under which administrative agencies are given ex-
tremely broad lawmaking authority. Thus, in addition to the revi-
sions in the committee system, 33 the abolition of delegations of
legislative authority to administrative agencies would prevent the
carefully constructed article I process from being subverted by pol-
iticians seeking merely to maximize their own political support.
34
Another unanticipated post-constitutional event has been the
broad construction of the commerce clause by the federal courts.
'31 The Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
are examples of agencies created with open-ended delegations of administrative authority.
See Mayton, supra note 124, at 963. For a thorough study of the failure of agencies with
broad delegations of authority to develop effective policies that serve the public interest, see
T. Lowi, supra note 64; see also Nichols & Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Work-
place: An Assessment of OSHA, 49 Pub. Interest 39, 42 (1977) (showing how OSHA has
imposed costs on businesses without any improvement in the incidence of work-related inju-
ries and illnesses); Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47 (1969)
(describing the negative impact of the policies of the FTC). But cf. Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 Va. L. Rev. 199, 235-68 (sharply criticizing public choice analyses of regula-
tory agencies' performances).
'32 Mayton, supra note 124, at 954. These three institutions represent different constitu-
encies with different preferences; this diversity of interests and goals raises the costs of
obtaining special interest legislation. From the perspective of Mayton's "grand legislative
committee," article I establishes a unanimity rule among these three bodies for passage of a
statute; each has veto power over any law that it opposes. See id. at 954 n.22.
133 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
134 A constitutional prohibition on delegations would not be costless. Mayton and others
have argued that the administrative agencies, created by Congress after first identifying a
defect and then working out the rudiments of a solution in the form of precise guidelines,
are successful in providing public benefits to private citizens. See Mayton, supra note 124,
at 963 (identifying the Securities Exchange Commission, the Social Security Administration,
and the Environmental Protection Agency as agencies held in relatively high regard in terms
of their "coherency, stability, and professionalism").
Any gap left by the elimination of administrative agencies would somehow have to be
filled. One possibility is that the states could play a greater role in the process of social
ordering than they do now. This would likely be an improvement over the present system.
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As Richard Epstein has argued, the benefits of federalism in the
constitutional system have been undercut significantly by the mas-
sive expansion of federal power under the commerce clause." 5 Ba-
sically, his argument posits that the increase in the federal govern-
ment's authority to regulate interstate commerce has resulted in a
usurpation by the federal government of many of the powers tradi-
tionally relegated to states and thereby has decreased the efficacy
of the federal system.
The expansion of the federal government through the creative
use of the commerce clause also has decreased the cost to interest
groups of achieving wealth transfers through the political process.
Under a constitutional system of truly limited national powers, to
obtain passage of a statute with a national impact, interest groups
have to obtain the support of fifty state governments (most of
which have bicameral legislatures and state executives with veto
power over legislative enactments). The ability of citizens to move
freely among the states provides a strong incentive for states to
refrain from passing laws that impose undue costs on certain sub-
groups of citizens.13 6 In contrast, under a constitutional system of
preeminent federal powers, to obtain passage of a statute with like
national impact, interest groups only have to obtain the support of
the national legislature or perhaps of an administrative agency
within the national government. Thus, the abolition of administra-
tive agencies would force the return of a large element of decision-
making authority back to the states, and would do so without the
need to rely on the good intentions of federal judges and
legislators.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic that voluntary transactions in the private sector
provide all parties to such trades with a net welfare gain. Other-
wise, the transactions would not occur. The occurrence of such
transactions also provides a net gain to the public at large as entre-
preneurs are forced by competitive pressures to provide high-qual-
ity goods and services at low prices.
,35 See Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Clause, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987);
Epstein, supra note 96, at 156.
131 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, the welfare implications of transactions that occur
because the legislature mandates them are indeterminate. Some
may provide net improvements in the social welfare; others clearly
do not. Often such transactions merely reflect the triumph of raw
political power over the disorganized public at large.
In any advanced society, persons in search of profit must decide
whether to allocate their efforts to the private sector, where they
pursue a strategy of wealth creation through trading, or to the
public sector, where they (for good or ill) pursue a strategy of
wealth transfer through rent-seeking. The latter strategy provides
counter-incentives to wealth creation and eventually will sap a na-
tion of its wealth. The core function of a well-ordered constitu-
tional regime is to restrain such wealth transfers and guide trans-
actions to the private sphere.
There are two ways to attain this goal. The first strategy is to
offer public officials adequate incentives to refrain from suc-
cumbing to the rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups.
This strategy is modeled on the primary tactic used by sharehold-
ers in public corporations to induce officers and directors to act in
the best interests of the shareholders. Unfortunately, due to the
lack of any pricing mechanism in the public sector that is analo-
gous to the market for shares of public corporations, this strategy
cannot easily be transferred to the realm of constitutional
economics.
The second strategy holds more promise. Under this alternative,
the governmental structure created by the Constitution is viewed
as a means of raising transaction costs to interest groups intent on
pursuing a policy of rent-seeking. These increased costs lower the
incidence of redistributive wealth transfers to the politically pow-
erful and, at the margin, guide profit seekers back to the private
sector.
The constitutional strategy of raising transaction costs manifests
itself in two ways. The first is through language, textual admoni-
tions to those in government not to shift costs to the politically
weak. This strategy, however, is likely to prove ineffective over
time. American constitutional history is a testament to the pro-
position that the language of constitutional directives, such as
those contained in the contract clause, the commerce clause, and
the takings clause, is almost infinitely malleable. As a result, con-
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stitutional directives do not hold much promise as effective con-
straints on rent-seeking behavior.
Alternatively, constitutions can seek to constrain rent-seekers by
creating institutional structures that effectively raise the transac-
tion costs of organized interest group activity. It is this strategy
that holds real promise for establishing a successful constitutional
order. Structural features such as the executive veto, the indepen-
dent judiciary, and the bicameral legislature (with differentiated
house sizes) are best seen as structural devices that raise the costs
of rent-seeking. The conventional wisdom among public choice
theorists disputes the conclusion that such structural features raise
the costs of interest groups' efforts to bring about wealth transfers.
Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that these features facilitate
rent-seeking by lowering rather than raising the costs of interest
group activities. But these theorists fail to understand the opera-
tion of these structural features. In addition, they fail to recognize
that the incentives leading interest groups to seek wealth transfers
during times of ordinary politics also lead interest groups to seek
to block such transactions during times of constitutional creation.
An examination of the United States Constitution provides sup-
port for the proposition that constitutions can be public-regarding,
even when the legislation generated under the subsequent consti-
tutional regime is not. The Constitution, in addition to providing a
farrago of admonitory constraints on government's acquiescence to
interest group demands, erects a number of structural devices that
are more effective at raising the transaction costs of interest group
activity.
The Constitution, however, does not appear to restrain suffi-
ciently the passage of special interest legislation. First, legislators
who want to avoid controversial or indeterminate decisions as to
which interest groups to favor can forfeit vast amounts of discre-
tion (and thus responsibility and accountability) to administrative
agencies, which function outside of the tripartite legislative process
envisioned by our constitutional structure. The modern adminis-
trative agency lowers the cost to interest groups of influencing the
political process; it conflicts in the most fundamental way imagin-
able with the core constitutional function of raising the transaction
costs to interest groups of obtaining passage of favored legislation.
The administrative agency is an invention of political entrepre-
neurs never envisioned by the framers.
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Second, modern technological developments have lowered trans-
action costs for special interest groups. Such groups are more
numerous and exert more direct political pressure than ever
before. The Constitution was designed to constrain a cruder form
of interest group activity at a time when the natural impediments
to interest group formation-in the form of information and com-
munication costs-were much higher than they are today. As a
consequence, altering certain aspects of the deliberative process
within Congress to raise the costs to interest groups of influencing
legislative outcomes is a wise course of action. Requiring considera-
tion and approval of statutes by a "Committee of the Whole"
before sending them to select committees is an example of such a
structural improvement.
It seems appropriate, however, to end on a note of caution. As
this Article has attempted to show, the incentives facing
lawmakers (and private citizens) during times of constitutional cre-
ation are fundamentally different than those at times of ordinary
lawmaking. Amendments to the Constitution fall between these
two categories. Though the amendment process is a topic worthy
of separate treatment, the incentives facing political actors during
the amendment process are less likely to generate public-regarding
outcomes than when a new government is being organized on a
clean slate, as it was in Philadelphia in 1787.
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